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The American regulatory state is under attack. Economists criti-
cize the irrationality of substantive policies.1 Political scientists attack
administrative policymaking and implementation as cumbersome, dis-
jointed, and adversarial.2 Law professors argue that the administra-
tive process is legalistic, time-consuming, and ineffective. 3 Commen-
tators, including some now on the federal bench, argue that judicial
scrutiny has induced agencies to make fewer rules and to seek less
accountable ways of making policy. 4 They urge the courts to defer
more frequently to agency decisions. 5 The criticisms have built to
such a crescendo that the system seems in crisis.
But appearances are deceiving. Although reform is needed, many
critics have overstated their case. The most popular reform proposals
would destroy much of value in the American system.
Modern democracies need to strike a balance between popular
control and expertise, at the same time as they restrain the influence
of narrow, organized groups. Bureaucratic policymaking is an inevi-
table consequence of the complexity of problems facing the modern
state. It cannot be performed by the legislature or the judiciary, but
it needs to be monitored both by these formal organs of state power
* Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale University.
B.A. 1964, Wellesley College; Ph.D. (economics) 1970, Yale University.
I For a general critique, see W. Kip Viscusi, Health and Safety Regulation, in AMERICAN
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 198oS, at 453, 501-02 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1994), and, on envi-
ronmental policy, the essays collected in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
(Paul R. Portney ed., 199o).
2 See, e.g., JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION:
How OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 1-17 (1988) (arguing that OSHA
regulates too few substances but imposes overly strict standards for those that it does regulate);
JOHN MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF OC-
CUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY 145-5o (1979) (recommending the use of cost-benefit
analyses in setting health and safety standards).
3 See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on
Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Winter
1994) (arguing for an end to preenforcement review); Rosemary O'Leary, The Impact of Federal
Court Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 563-67 (i989) (arguing that judicial review has led the EPA
to devote excessive resources to litigation).
4 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAv & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
passim (199 o ) (arguing that judicial review has impelled the NHTSA from rulemaking to product
recalls); Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, REGULATION,
July-Aug. 1981, at 25, 27 (arguing that recent developments, including exacting judicial review,
have given agencies reason to reconsider policymaking by adjudication).
s See, e.g., R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT passim (1983) (arguing that judges should defer more frequently to the EPA).
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and by ordinary citizens. 6 Although the administrative process must
be under bureaucratic control, both judicial review and administrative
attention to outside individuals and groups are necessary to ensure
democratic legitimacy and competence.
My own view of the proper judicial role draws on two recent
developments in social science. First, social choice theory demon-
strates the fundamental difficulties of making consistent policy choices
under democratic conditions. It teaches that democracy may produce
illogical and inconsistent results. 7 Rational choice models of politics
counsel careful monitoring of the representative system because of the
weak incentives for citizens to become informed about political
choices. Second, policy analysis recommends the systematic weighing
of costs and benefits as a means of improving executive-branch policy-
making.
8
My joint commitments to expertise and to democracy lead me to
conclude that delegation is justified, but only if administrative pro-
cedures are open and accountable. The rational choice literature sug-
gests that the legislative process requires monitoring. As a conse-
quence, I have argued elsewhere for a two-fold judicial role in
reviewing both the activities of federal regulatory agencies and the
actions of Congress. 9 First, courts should impose a background cost-
benefit norm when agencies implement laws that seek to improve the
efficiency of the economy.' 0 Such a background norm would make it
more difficult for Congress to pass laws that favor narrow interests
unless Congress clearly states its intention to do so in the text of the
statute." Second, courts should acknowledge what has always been
obvious to political scientists and Washington observers - that Con-
gress often takes actions that do not have majority support and then
disguises what it has done. The courts should take some modest steps
to improve the transparency of the legislative process. They should
review statutes for harmony between means and ends, review appro-
6 See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CON-
TROL OF BUREAUCRACY 13-95 (iggo) (examining the relationship between politics, law, and
expertise and urging reform to promote sound government and more effective judicial review);
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE
AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 33-42 (1992).
7 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 2-6 (1989). The classic proof of this
result appears in KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 9-21 (2d ed.
1963).
8 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 14-I9; EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER,
A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 134-58 (1978).
9 See ROSE-ACKERmAN, supra note 6, at 33-79.
10 See id. at 33-42.
11 The D.C. Circuit recently supported the use of such a norm under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1988). See International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d
1310, 1318-21 (D.C. Cir. i99I).
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priations for consistency with statutory purposes, and forbid the in-
clusion of substantive provisions in appropriations acts.12 The aim of
these proposals is to improve the operation of Congress, but they will
also ease the job of public administrators by giving bureaucrats a
more realistic set of goals to accomplish.
Although these suggestions have proved controversial, 13 they do,
I believe, respond to fundamental weaknesses in American public law.
In contrast, other proposed reforms, with more salience in the current
reform debate, do not. In particular, the alternatives of regulatory
negotiation and restricted judicial review are inadequate if one accepts
my basic commitment to both the democratic legitimacy of the ad-
ministrative process and the need for an expert bureaucracy.
To evaluate the current debate over American administrative law,
I contrast our system with Germany's quite different structure. I use
environmental regulation as an example because achieving a balance
between democratic legitimacy and technical knowledge is hardest,
and most important, in areas - like environmental policy - in which
expertise is essential and the interests of consumers, labor, industry,
and local residents are opposed. Germany and the United States have
faced remarkably similar challenges in the administration of environ-
mental policy. Because the complex nature of environmental problems
prevents legislators from resolving all issues within the text of statutes,
legislatures in both countries have delegated policymaking authority
to the executive.
Germany and the United States diverge sharply, however, in the
external constraints they impose on high-level bureaucrats. The Ger-
man public law system focuses mainly on the protection of individual
rights against the state, rather than on the oversight of executive
processes. No judicially enforceable statute governs ministerial poli-
cymaking processes. German administrative law thus has much in
common with the proposals of two very different groups of American
reformers: those who support more consensual processes and those
who advocate restricted judicial review. Justice Scalia, for one, would
be at home in Germany.
Germany provides a benchmark for the domestic debate because
at first glance its system of administrative law and public policymak-
ing seems an ideal response to the pathologies of the American system;
many of the problems that American commentators find so vexing do
not arise in Germany. I will argue, however, that adoption of the
German system would be one more illustration of the dangers inherent
in getting what one says one wants - recall the movie hero who
12 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 43-79.
13 See the following reviews: John J. Donohue lI, Book Review, 13 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 192, 194-96 ('994); Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278,
1293-96 ('993); John M. Quigley, Book Review, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 2001, 2001 (1993).
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wishes for a quiet life in the country surrounded by women and wakes
up to find himself transformed into a nun.14
I. REFORM PROPOSALS
I focus on two contrasting reform proposals for the United States,
both of which can be critically examined in light of the German
experience. One group of reformers deplores the adversarial quality
of the administrative process and urges the adoption of consensus-
building procedures. These critics would limit the role of the courts
by reducing the incentives to appeal to them. The second group
argues that judicial review of the administrative process should focus
on the preservation of individual rights in the face of state power.
These reformers insist that the courts should restrict their own juris-
diction.
A. Consensual Processes and Environmental Protection
Those who favor negotiated solutions recommend regulatory ne-
gotiation, business-government cooperation, and advisory committee
structures. The aim is to streamline and speed up the regulatory
process by fostering an atmosphere of trust and cooperation among
the affected groups. Greater use of consensual processes has won
support from the Administrative Conference and from a variety of
reform-minded observers. 15
Such reforms have recently taken statutory form in the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 199o, which encourages the use of regulatory
negotiation to draft proposed rules.16 Under the Act, representatives
of the affected interests meet with an agency representative and at-
tempt to work out a compromise with the help of a "facilitator."17
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires agencies to complete
the informal rulemaking process, 18 and still permits judicial review,
but a successful negotiation should limit the range of disputes and
save time. The 199o Act is admittedly too new to be evaluated
14 The movie Bedazzled is a modern British retelling of the Faust legend. See BEDAZZLED
(Twentieth Century Fox 1968).
Is See I C.F.R. § 305.82-4, .85-5 (1993) (presenting the proposals of the Administrative
Conference of the United States); NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK passim (David M.
Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 199o); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for
Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1, 28-31, 42-118 (1982).
16 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (Supp. IV 1992). The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,
id. §§ 571-583, authorizes the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques in the implemen-
tation of statutes in particular cases.
17 See id. § 566.
18 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
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confidently. Nevertheless, experience under older laws suggests that
success will require careful issue selection and process design.19
Regulatory negotiation is not suitable for most environmental pol-
icy issues, in part because many environmental programs are designed
to correct market failures. A scarce resource, such as air or water, is
used as if it were free, causing uncompensated harm to the population.
In principle, the market failure could be corrected and the gains
redistributed so that everyone would be better off. The existence of
net gains makes the problem appear amenable to a negotiated solution.
In practice, this is seldom the case. Several fundamental problems
stand in the way of negotiation, including the difficulty of finding a
manageable number of truly representative participants, sharp dis-
agreements about the distribution of gains and losses, and the need
to develop a knowledge base derived from scientific principles.
20
Thus, application of regulatory negotiation to market failures in the
environmental field ought to be limited to cases in which these basic
difficulties can be resolved.
In order to resolve these difficulties, administrative officials must
be able to do three things. First, they must identify those affected by
the negotiation, and ensure that all of the affected parties are repre-
sented effectively by organized groups. 2 1 Diffuse, unorganized inter-
ests - like consumers or those who breathe the air - will be hard
to represent, 22 and groups that claim to speak for such individuals
will have difficulty proving their claims. These problems of represen-
tation mean that negotiation is not useful for complex environmental
harms that affect millions of people spread out over large geographic
areas. 23 In contrast, alternative dispute resolution techniques may
succeed in bringing together people affected by specific government
choices that have determinate local environmental effects. 24 Alter-
natively, a two-step process might be used: experts could come to a
consensus on technical matters, and their negotiated consensus could
19 See NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK, supra note i5, at 327-43; Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking in Practice, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 482, 484-85 (1986).
20 For example, a recent negotiation over rules for disinfectants and disinfection byproducts
in drinking water was stymied by the lack of scientific data. The negotiators themselves
recommended additional spending on research. See DisinfectantlByproduct Negotiation Process
Leaves Scientific Gaps, Advisory Board Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1201, 1201 (Oct. 29, 1993).
21 The groups must not be deeply divided within themselves, and they must all be represented
by competent and well-informed people. See 5 U.S.C. § 563; Perritt, supra note i9, at
484-85.
22 See Perritt, supra note i9, at 485.
23 See Rudolf Steinberg, Kritik von Verhandlungsloisungen, insbesondere von mittlerunter-
statzten Entscheidungen, in I KONFLIKTBEVALTIGUNG DURCH VERHANDLUNGEN 295, 304-05
(Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem & Eberhard Schmidt-Ailmann eds., 199o) (arguing that negotiated
solutions are not suitable for rulings that affect large numbers of people).
24 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583.
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then serve as a starting point for ordinary notice-and-comment rule-
making.
25
Second, even if the representation problem can be solved, the
authorities must clarify exactly which decisions the negotiation group
is to make and which decisions will be left to the bureaucracy. They
must also provide the basic framework of scientific and technical
knowledge. The public officials must explain how they will reach a
decision if the negotiation fails. This is a key strategic step that affects
both the probability of a successful result and the acceptability of the
outcome. If the decision is to be made by consensus, the different
groups will only agree if all of them are better off under that choice
than under the fallback position.
2 6
Third, the authorities must determine the ground rules. Regula-
tory negotiation is predicated on reaching a consensus. But consensus
can be sought by many methods. Considerable controversy has cen-
tered around the form of the negotiation. Should government officials
participate? 27 Should meetings be open or private?28 Should a me-
diator or moderator guide the process? 29 Should the authorities supply
experts to evaluate the technical aspects of the problem? 30 If the
system of representation is satisfactory, government officials need not
attend, and meetings can be private. If it is not, the addition of
bureaucrats and the creation of a more open process are unlikely to
compensate satisfactorily for this failure. In such cases, the state
should either follow normal APA requirements or submit the issue to
the legislature for resollition by majoritarian processes.
In short, regulatory negotiation should have only limited applica-
bility to the environmental field. It is only appropriate for a certain
narrow class of issues, and even for those issues the process must be
carefully designed if democratic legitimacy is to be preserved and an
25 The problem with such a process is that important options might be eliminated by
technocrats and public officials at the first stage, before citizens are given a right to participate
in a public hearing. In the German context, see Bernd Holznagel, Mittlerunterstiitzte Aushand-
lungsprozesse aus Anlafl abfallrechtlicher Planfeststellungsverfahren, in WANDEL DER HAND-
LUNGSFORMEN IM OFFENTLICHEN RECHT 99, io6-3 (Kathrin Becker-Schwarze, Wolfgang
Kdck, Thomas Kupka & Matthias von Schwanenflfigel eds., iggi); and Steinberg, cited above
in note 23, at 311.
26 See Perritt, supra note rg, at 484.
27 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 565(b), 566(b) (requiring the participation of agency representatives);
Perritt, supra note ig, at 490 (recommending the participation of government officials).
28 See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 19, at 486-87 (recommending private meetings).
29 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 563(b), 566(c), 568, 569 (providing for both a convener and a
facilitator).
30 See, e.g., Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Verhandlungsltsungen und Mittlereinsatz irn Bereich
der Verwaltung: Eine vergleichende Einfilhrung, in x KONFLIKTBEWA.LTIGUNG DURCH VER-
HANDLUNGEN, supra note 23, at 13, 21-23 (discussing the use of technical experts in regulatory
negotiation in the German legal context).
1284 [Vol. 107:1279
HeinOnline -- 107 Harv. L. Rev.  1284 1993-1994
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNDER SIEGE
acceptable outcome reached. As we shall see when we examine the
German system, consensual processes are not necessarily desirable.
B. Restrictions on Judicial Review
Justice Antonin Scalia is the chief American judicial advocate of
sharp restrictions on judicial review. According to Justice Scalia, the
courts should avoid the political issues that arise in the oversight of
the rulemaking process. He argues that reviewing courts should give
only those who have suffered individual injuries standing to raise
issues related to violations of their rights. Agencies, freed from intru-
sive court review, would then be able to revamp the administrative
process for greater efficiency. Statutory deadlines could be met more
frequently, and less agency time would be taken up with defending
against court challenges. To clarify Justice Scalia's position, consider
two recent Supreme Court opinions that denied standing to organized
wildlife groups that sought to challenge government actions.
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,31 a wildlife group chal-
lenged the Federal Bureau of Land Management's land classification
policy, which had opened up certain lands to mining. In a five-to-
four decision, the Court denied the group standing.32 In dicta,
33
Justice Scalia went on to discuss preenforcement review of regula-
tions, 34 which he argued should be a narrow exception to the general
rule that:
a regulation is not ordinarily considered . "ripe" for judicial review
under the APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to
more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out,
by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant's
situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him.
35
Justice Scalia thus took the opportunity to criticize attempts to influ-
ence agency policymaking through the courts. General acceptance of
Justice Scalia's position would make review of high-level policymaking
more difficult. It would make challenges mounted by environmental
groups especially problematic because regulations are seldom directed
at them.
Justice Scalia seems to have gone even further in the second case,
although the actual breadth of the Court's holding is in some doubt.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife36 concerned a wildlife group's challenge
" 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
32 See id. at 885-89.
33 See id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that Justice Scalia's discussion of
preenforcement review of regulations is dictum).
34 The seminal case in this area is Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
3S National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 891.
36 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
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to a rule that limits the scope of the Endangered Species Act of '973
to actions within the United States and on the high seas. Two mem-
bers of the group had traveled to Egypt and Sri Lanka and stated
that they intended to return. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
denied standing.37
Not content to rest there, Justice Scalia proceeded to deal with
the issue of "procedural injury." The court of appeals had held that
the citizen-suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act gave the
wildlife group standing to seek court review of executive branch con-
sultation procedures. Justice Scalia rejected this reasoning:
This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural
requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete
interest of theirs . . . . Rather, the court held that the injury-in-fact
requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all
persons of an abstract, self-contained, non-instrumental "right" to have
the Executive observe the procedures required by law. We reject this
view.
38
Justice Scalia recognized that procedural rights have a special status
when concrete interests are at stake. 39 But his opinion rejected in
strong terms the notion that courts may vindicate the public interest40
- this is the function of Congress and the president. Justice Scalia
thus denies that it is legitimate for Congress to use the courts to
monitor the executive.
Most environmental statutes include provisions for citizen suits, 41
and recognize public interest groups as "citizens." In the course of
criticizing Justice Scalia's opinion in Defenders of Wildlife, Cass Sun-
stein argues that the decision held all such citizen suits unconstitu-
tional, because the statutory provisions seldom require the impairment
of a "separate concrete interest" of the plaintiff.42 Professor Sunstein
goes too far when he elevates Justice Scalia's strong language to the
status of constitutional law, but he has raised the possibility that
37 See id. at 2137-40.
38 Id. at 2 142-43.
39 In such cases, requirements of redressability and immediacy can be waived. See id. at
2142 n.7.
40 See id. at 2145.
41 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Oil Pollution
Act § 1017, 33 U.S.C. § 2717 (Supp. II 199o); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002,
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Clean Air Act § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. II i99o);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 113, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659 (1988). The one exception is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
42 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article I1, 91 MICH. L. REv. 63, 200-02 (1992).
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Justice Scalia's musings could gain constitutional status in some future
case.4
3
Justice Scalia's position ignores the value of the basic principles of
informal rulemaking and judicial review under the APA. He seeks to
rule out just the sort of judicial review that the courts are best able
to perform without taking on a policymaking role. 44 Under the APA
the ultimate policymaking decision is in the hands of the bureaucracy,
but administrative discretion is constrained by the need for public
notice, a hearing, and a statement of reasons. 45 Thus, the process is
open to opinions and information from outside groups, but it is not
under the control of these groups. Such bureaucrat-led processes are
generally appropriate in the environmental area, because of the prob-
lems of representation. Bureaucratic discretion is subject to judicial
review both of procedure and of substance under an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard.4 6 Although statutory and judicial overlays may
have unduly elaborated the APA provisions, the basic structure should
not be abandoned. To follow Justice Scalia's line would be to overlook
the important role courts have to play in ensuring the democratic
legitimacy of bureaucratic procedures under the American separation-
of-powers doctrine.
II. THE GERMAN DISADVANTAGE IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
4 7
So far I have argued that neither advocates of regulatory negoti-
ation nor supporters of reduced judicial oversight have offered ac-
ceptable solutions to the problems of the American regulatory state.
A study of the German system confirms the inadequacy of these
43 Contrary to Sunstein's view, Justice Scalia's opinion did not clearly delineate the limits of
congressional authority to include citizen suit provisions in legislation. Commenting on this
issue, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, stated that "Congress has the power to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to suggest a contrary view." Defenders
of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Presumably, if Justices Kennedy and Souter had read Justice Scalia's language to
express this "contrary view," they would not have concurred in his opinion. Furthermore,
Justice Stevens, who concurred only in the judgment, took a broad view of citizen and group
standing. See id. at 2147 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). If these three Justices are
combined with the two dissenters, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, it appears that five mem-
bers of the Court take a permissive view of Congress's ability to define the injuries that can
create standing.
44 See id. at 2158 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the opinion's "anachronistically
formal view of the separation of powers").
4S See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
46 See id. § 706.
47 With apologies to John H. Langbein. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in
Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985).
I1994] 1287
HeinOnline -- 107 Harv. L. Rev.  1287 1993-1994
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
proposed reforms. Germany's environmental policymaking processes
and its restricted system of judicial review fail to provide democratic
legitimacy - at least as that phrase is understood in American dem-
ocratic theory.
A. Legislative and Constitutional Structure
The centrality of party politics in the German political system has
profound implications for the process of environmental policymaking.
Although Germany's system of proportional representation facilitated
the creation of a Green party,48 it may also have discouraged other,
extra-parliamentary forms of policy activism. According to German
views of democracy, individuals who oppose the policies of the gov-
erning coalition should focus on changing the government through
electoral, party politics, rather than by influencing day-to-day poli-
cymaking. 49 In addition, because the same party coalition controls
both the legislative and executive branches, formal legal constraints
on bureaucratic policymaking should be unnecessary.
The German reality - at least in the area of environmental policy
- is not nearly so well ordered as the theory suggests. German
statutes are not precise statements of policy, but are full of vague and
undefined terms that require further interpretation before the acts can
be implemented. Because of the complex technical nature of environ-
mental issues and because of the difficult tradeoffs faced by those
seeking to control pollution, the Bundestag has been no more suc-
cessful at giving clear direction to the executive than the United States
Congress has been.
The German approach differs from the American, however, be-
cause Germany's constitution, the Grundgesetz,50 explicitly limits the
regulatory activity of the executive. Before a regulation can be issued,
the Grundgesetz requires the Bundestag to delegate regulatory author-
ity by specifying the "content, purpose, and scope" of the authorization
in the statutory language.5 1 In addition, the substantive, judge-made
principle of "proportionality" constrains both legislative and executive
48 The Green Party has been in the Bundestag since 1983 and is part of the coalition
government in several Lnder. See Edda Miller, Sozial-liberale Ulnweltpolitik: Von der Karriere
eines neuen Politikbereichs, DAS PARLAMENT (Supp., Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte), Nov. 17,
1989, at 3, ii.
49 See PETER 3. KATZENSTEIN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 44 (1987) (arguing
that German political parties are "an essential institutional node linking state and society").
50 The foundational document promulgated in 1949 was called a Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
rather than a constitution to emphasize the provisional character of the divided German state.
In this Article, however, I will use the terms "Grundgesetz" and "constitution" interchangeably.
51 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 8o(i); see also THEODOR MAUNZ, GUNTER DORIG, ROMAN
HERZOG, RUPERT SCHOLZ, HANS-JORGEN PAPIER, ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER & EBERHARD
SCHMIDT-ASSMANN, 3 GRUNDGESETZ: KOMMENTAR, art. 80, at 5 (1993) (explaining the consti-
tutional mandate of delegation of regulatory authority).
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policymaking. This principle has four parts:5 2 first, the aim of the
law must be legitimate; second, the means must be in proportion to
the ends; third, the means must be an effective way of reaching the
ends; and fourth, the means must intrude as little as possible upon
individual rights. Both the delegation doctrine and the proportionality
principle could, in theory, impose strong checks on legislative drafts-
men and executive-branch policymaking, but in practice they impose
only modest constraints.
5 3
Another important constraint on federal regulatory activity in Ger-
many is the constitutional requirement that the upper house of the
legislature, the Bundesrat, approve all regulations and guidelines that
the states will administer.5 4 Because Germany's federal system dele-
gates most implementation to the states,55 the Bundesrat enjoys veto
power over a wide range of executive branch activity, including
all major environmental initiatives. As state government officials,
Bundesrat members are, however, generally more concerned with
the ease of implementation than with the merit of the substantive
policies.
5 6
B. The Administrative Process
German law places few limitations on governmental rulemaking
procedures. Constitutional doctrines do not regulate high-level ad-
ministrative processes. Once the Constitutional Court accepts the
constitutionality of a substantive government action, it inquires no
further into the procedural details. Statutory law has not filled this
gap. The German Administrative Procedure Act governs the behavior
of public agencies only when they implement general policies in par-
ticular cases.5 7 It does not apply to the formulation of legal regula-
tions and administrative guidelines.
Unlike the American rulemaking process, German law imposes
few procedural constraints on the activities of the Environmental
Ministry. Officials are free to assign aspects of their tasks to outside
S2 The principle is said by the courts and commentators to derive from the fundamental
rights protected by the Grundgesetz. See THEODOR MAUNZ & REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS,
DEUTSCHES STAATSRECHT 95 (28th ed. iggi); JnRGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 688 (1992).
S3 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF
PUBLIC LAw IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES ch. 6 (forthcoming 1994) (arguing that,
in practice, German courts do not strictly apply the proportionality principle in complex technical
matters).
S4 See GG arts. 80(2), 84(2), 85(2). The Bundesrat is composed of members of state govern-
ments, with votes apportioned roughly by population. See GG arts. 50-53.
s See GG arts. 83-85; KATZENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 20.
56 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 53, ch. 5.
S7 See Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [VwVfG] § 35, 1976 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1.] I 1253,
128919941
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groups, state-federal working groups, or advisory bodies. Typically,
the ministry seeks advice from such groups before instituting more
formal procedures. The process lacks adequate procedural safeguards,
and in a few cases even the usual formalities can be avoided.
58
i. Consensual Processes. - In practice, the German government
delegates certain technical decisions to private groups and routinely
consults with federal advisory committees of experts and interest group
representatives in the course of setting environmental standards.
These consensual practices, derived from labor-management relations
and industrial self-regulation,5 9 are often poorly adapted to environ-
mental issues 60 and demonstrate the risks of an uncritical endorsement
of regulation through negotiation.
(a) Private Norm-setting Organizations. - Private norm-setting
organizations have long played a key role in the self-regulation of
economic activity outside the environmental arena. 61 Their original
role as standard-setters for industry now extends into the environ-
mental field. 62 The most important norm-setting organizations are the
German Institute for Norms (Deutsches Institutfir Normung, DIN)
63
s See infra p. 1300.
59 See KATZENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 58-64; see also THE REGULATION GAME: How
BRITISH AND WEST GERMAN COMPANIES BARGAIN WITH GOVERNMENT 152-54 (Alan Peacock
ed., 1984) (demonstrating that the German administrative system encourages negotiation between
firms and regulators).
60 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 53, ch. 8 (discussing the difficulties that arose when
Germany experimented with regulatory negotiation in environmental cases). For general works
on the role of negotiation in German environmental law, see i KONFLIKTBEVALTIGUNG DURCH
VERHANDLUNGEN, cited above in note 23, at 217-335; and BERND HOLZNAGEL, KONFLIKTLO-
SUNG DURCH VERHANDLUNGEN 177-302 (I99O).
61 There are 170 such bodies in Germany. See Klaus Grefen, Harmonization of Technical
Rules for Clean Air in View of the European Internal Market 3 (Nov. i991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). The legal status of the norms that
these groups set is a controversial issue in German law. See Gert Brilggemeier & Josef Falke,
Product Safety Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, in EUROPEAN PRODUCT SAFETY,
INTERNAL MARKET POLICY AND THE NEW APPROACH TO TECHNICAL HARMONISATION AND
STANDARDS I, 8-12 (Christian Joerges ed., 199i); Peter Marburger, Die gleitende Verweisung
aus der Sicht der Wissenschaft, in VERWEISUNG AUF TECHNISCHE NORMEN IN RECHTSVOR-
SCHRIFTEN: SYMPOSIUM 27, 39 (Deutsches Institut ffir Normung ed., 1982).
62 See ERHARD DENNINGER, VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE ANFORDERUNGEN AN DIE NORM-
SETZUNG IM UMWELT- UND TECHNIKRECHT 13 (i990) (describing the principle of "cooperation"
between governmental organs and non-governmental organizations in the area of environmental
protection); Martin Fiihr, Technische Normen in demokratischer Gesellschaft, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR UMWELTRECHT 99, 99 (1993); Irene Lamb, Die Bedeutung technischer Normen irn Un-
weltrecht, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UMWELTRECHT 97, 99 (1993); Gertrude Lfibbe-Wolff, Verfas-
sungsrechtliche Fragen der Normsetzung und Normkonkretisierung im Umweltrecht, 6 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR GESETZGEBUNG 219, 221 (1991).
63 See Brfiggemeier & Falke, supra note 6i, at 50-74; Fiihr, supra note 62, at 101-02; Lamb,
supra note 62, at 97. As of 199o, the DIN had 20,988 standards on its books. Almost 4000
working groups of the DIN exist to set standards in a variety of fields. See Grefen, supra note
61, at i, tbl. 3. The DIN contract with the federal government, which dates from 1975,
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and the Association of German Engineers (Verein Deutscher Inge-
nieure, VDI).6 4 The DIN has a committee for nuclear engineering,
and in 199o the DIN and the VDI established a Commission on Air
Pollution Prevention with financial support from the federal govern-
ment. 65 In addition to the self-regulation these organizations support,
the Environmental Ministry has sometimes used their standards as
guides to the implementation of statutes in the environmental area.
The use of norms generated by private technical groups can intro-
duce systematic bias into the policymaking process. Consider the
VDI-DIN Commission on Air Pollution Prevention. Although there
are some representatives of government on the Commission, member-
ship is heavily weighted toward experts employed by industry, and
environmental groups are not represented at all.6 6 In addition, al-
though committee members are "volunteers," the members' employers,
rather than the individuals themselves, bear the cost of participation.
As a consequence, many critics have charged that industrial interests
are overrepresented.
67
After preliminary proposals have been formulated in private com-
mittee meetings, they are made available to the public, including
environmental groups, for comment. The committee formulates a
final recommendation, which may incorporate these comments. 68 En-
vironmental groups, however, often lack the necessary financial and
technical resources to provide effective review within the time con-
straints of the public comment process.
69
Because the committees do not have the relevant expertise and do
not adequately represent all the affected interests, and because the
excluded interests cannot provide effective review, the influence of
private norm-setting organizations is troubling. 7° The problem is
requires the DIN to take the public interest into account when setting standards. See Christoph
Gusy, Wertungen und Interessen in der technischen Normung, 6 UMWELT- UND PLANUNGS-
RECHT 241, 245 (1986).
64 The VDI, founded in 1856, has iro,ooo individual members. See Grefen, supra note 61,
at 2. Also important are the Verband Deutscher Elektrotechniker (VDE) and the Deutscher
Verein des Gas- und Wasserfaches (DVGW). See DENNINGER, supra note 62, at 78.
65 See KOMMISSION REINHALTUNG DER LuFT IM VDI UND DIN, AUFBAU, AUFGABEN,
ERGEBNISSE 1-7 (1991); Grefen, supra note 61, at 3.
66 In contrast, DIN consumer product standard committees have included representatives of
consumer groups since 1974. See BrUggemeier & Falke, supra note 61, at 68-72.
67 See Heiko Wagener, Der Anspruch auf Immissionsschutz: Plidoyer far ein einklagbares
Recht, 2 NATUR UND RECHT 71, 74 (i988) (noting that the VDI-DIN Commission on Air
Pollution Prevention is biased in favor of industry).
68 See Fiihr, supra note 62, at ioi; Gusy, supra note 63, at 246; Liabbe-Wolff, supra note
62, at 229.
69 See Ffihr, supra note 62, at ioi.
70 Several German administrative law scholars have urged both reduced reliance on the
recommendations of private groups and increased transparency in the standard-setting processes
used by these groups. See Fritz Ossenbiihl, Informelles Hoheitshandeln im Gesundheits- und
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broader than the possible biases introduced by the members' institu-
tional affiliations. The VDI-DIN Commission's members are primar-
ily engineers and natural scientists, with only a smattering of social
scientists. Indeed, economists are in a residual, five-percent category
along with "lawyers,... art historians, and other disciplines. '71 Even
highly competent scientists and engineers are unlikely to be sensitive
to the broader social implications of their recommendations. Because
environmental problems cannot be neatly divided into technical and
political segments, judgments will necessarily involve a balancing of
costs and benefits. 72 Engineers do not necessarily make good policy
analysts. Engineers' resolutions of mixed issues of technology and
policy tend toward "standard-setting" rather than toward a more nu-
anced view of the link between means and ends.
This is not to say, of course, that the United States has found just
the right mixture of engineering and social science. It has not. Amer-
ican policy is frequently criticized for favoring technical fixes over
performance standards or tradable rights. The United States and
Germany face similar substantive failures of policy. 73 However, the
fact that engineering and technical groups play a smaller role in the
American administrative process suggests that new policy-oriented
ideas from the social sciences may gain acceptance more easily in the
United States. The German model of consensual development of
technical standards, by contrast, overemphasizes engineering solutions
and limits public access to the process. 74 Even if the private norm-
setting groups included a broader range of experts, they would still
face the limitations of any technical body called upon to make policy
judgments.
(b) Advisory Committees. - Although German private standard-
setting organizations frequently recommend technical standards, these
groups have no formal decisionmaking authority. The ministry or the
cabinet holds ultimate responsibility for legal regulations and guide-
lines, subject to Bundesrat approval. To provide further outside as-
Umweltschutz, 3 JAHRBUCH DES UMWELT- UND TECHNIKRECHTS 27, 47 (1987); see also DEN-
NINGER, supra note 62, at I95 (arguing that the constitutional "Democracy Principle" forbids
too much delegation of standard-setting power to non-governmental organizations); Lilbbe-Wolff,
supra note 62, at 248 (advocating greater openness and transparency in environmental norm-
setting).
71 KoMMISSION REINHALTUNG DER LuFT IM VDI UND DIN, supra note 65, at 2, tbl. x.
72 Policy analysis is not a well-developed field in Germany. For instance, the Umweltbun-
desamt, the technical advisory body to the Environmental Ministry, consists largely of scientists
and engineers. Of the 417 professionals employed by the Umweltbundesamt in 1991, only i5
had a degree in economics, and 18 in political science or psychology. See UMWELTBUNDESAMT,
ANNUAL REPORT 1991: ENGLISH SUMxmARY 6 (1992).
73 For an overview of the weaknesses in the German and American systems, see ROSE-
AcKERmAN, cited above in note 53, ch. 3.
74 For an effort by the Administrative Conference of the United States to grapple with these
issues, see I C.F.R. § 305.78-4 (1993).
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sistance - political as well as technical - several statutes require
that the ministry seek advice from advisory committees that include
representatives of industry, labor, science and, occasionally, environ-
mental or consumer groups. The composition of the committee may
be specified by law, but the ministry selects the individual members.
Consider, for example, the regulation of nuclear power in Ger-
many. There are three main governmental advisory committees, all
of which are dominated by the power industry or by scientists with
a commitment to nuclear power. 75 The Nuclear Technology Com-
mittee (Kerntechnischer Ausschufl), for example, fails to ensure broad
representation of interests. 76 Of the Committee's fifty members, ten
represent producers and builders of nuclear equipment and plants, ten
represent power companies, ten represent state and federal regulatory
agencies, ten represent expert bodies, and the remaining ten represent
a diverse collection of groups. The committee votes using a five-sixths
rule, so that any of the five groups can block any action.
All of the advisory committees are subject to the same criticisms
as the DIN and the VDI. The committees seem to be too much under
the sway of the regulated industry and of the scientists whose liveli-
hood depends on the industry's continued viability.7 7 American ob-
servers who praise the cooperative regulatory environment in
Germany78 need to acknowledge that such advisory bodies frequently
have an unrepresentative character.
Defenders of the German system take a broader view of the polit-
ical landscape. Ronald Czada, a student of German nuclear-power
regulation, argues, for instance, that the system maintains a reason-
able balance between industry and the public interest. 79 Although the
advisory committees are dominated by industry, and day-to-day im-
plementation is carried out by self-regulatory bodies, he argues that
the industry as a whole is concerned with safety because it fears anti-
nuclear political action. He claims that German producers of nuclear
power will try to avoid a major accident because of the severe political
repercussions that would follow.
75 See Roland Czada, Konfliktbewaltigung und politische Reform in vernetzten Entschei-
dungsstrukturen: Das Beispiel der kerntechnischen Sicherheitsregulierung, in VERHANDLUNGS-
DEMOKRATIE, INTERESSENVERMITTLUNG, REGIERBARKEIT 73, 78-79 (Roland Czada & Manfred
G. Schmidt eds., i993); Rudolf Steinberg, Untergesetzliche Regelwerke und Gremien, in REFORM
DES ATOMRECHTS (Rudolf Steinberg ed., forthcoming x994) (manuscript at 17, on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
76 See Ossenbfihl, supra note 7o, at 4-42; Steinberg, supra note 75, at 12 & n.43.
77 See Ffihr, supra note 62, at ioi; see also Steinberg, supra note 75, at 17 (arguing that the
technical standards set by advisory committees essentially determine the content of laws and
regulations).
78 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitive-
ness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2o83 (1993) (arguing that other developed countries, including
Germany, have more flexible and cooperative systems of environmental regulation).
79 See Czada, supra note 75, at 79-81.
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This sanguine view of the current situation raises an important
question: are the concerns of environmentalists best incorporated into
the regulatory process by giving such groups direct access to decision-
-making institutions or by letting their political protests act as a back-
ground constraint? The German public law tradition takes the view
that outside protest, rather than inside participation, is the better
course. I claim that direct access - more typical of the American
policymaking process - is ultimately more conducive to good policy
and is more democratically legitimate. American environmentalists
cannot content themselves with being gadflies, but need to become
well-informed, technically sophisticated participants in the environ-
mental policymaking process. Mobilization is not sufficient. Influence
comes primarily, not from being a nuisance, but from rational argu-
mentation and from having an informed constituency.
2. Public Participation and Information. - Using the output of
the private norm-setting groups, advisory committees, and state-fed-
eral working groups, the German Environmental Ministry 'proposes
draft regulations and guidelines to the cabinet. This process is infor-
mal, private, consensual, and unreviewable. Ministry proceedings
need not be accompanied by public notice, public hearings, or a
statement of reasons. There is no judicial review of the adequacy of
representation, and the public has no general right of access either to
executive branch officials or to the information that they possess.8 0
Members of the public have a legal right to obtain information
held by the government only if they can demonstrate a suspected
violation of their individual rights in the context of an administrative
proceeding. 8' A European Community directive, however, requires
member states to pass laws that permit access to environmental in-
formation without a demonstration that anyone's rights have been
violated.8 2 Although draft laws under this directive have been pro-
posed in Germany, controversy over the breadth of the term "envi-
ronmental information" has meant that no statute has yet passed.8 3
Moreover, although environmental groups do participate in certain
lower-level planning and licensing processes, the government is under
no legal obligation to consult with them.8 4 An internal government
so See RosE-AcKERfAN, supra note 53, ch. 5.
81 The statute guarantees access, first, only to files that are defined as part of an "adminis-
trative process," see VwVfG § 9, 1976 BGBl. I 1253, 1257, and second, only to those who have
a personal legal interest in obtaining access to the files, see VwVfG § 29, 1976 BGBI. I 1253,
1261.
82 See Council Directive 90/313 of 7 June i9go on the Freedom of Access to Information on
the Environment, art. 3, 199o O.J. (L 158) 56, 57.
83 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 53, ch. 9.
84 See Ulrich Linse, Dieter Rucht, Winfried Kretschmer & Reinhard Falter, Von der Bitt-
schrift zur Platzbesetzung: Ein Vergleich, in VON DER BITTSCHRIFT ZUR PLATZBESETZUNG:
KONFLIKTE UM TECHNISCHE GROSSPROJEKTE 231-43 (Ulrich Linse, Reinhard Falter, Dieter
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ordinance states that ministries should consult with interested groups,
but provides no enforcement mechanism. 85 Some statutes specify the
interests that should be consulted when rules and guidelines are pro-
mulgated, but environmental organizations and public interest groups
are seldom included in these lists. 86 Because compliance with these
provisions is not subject to judicial review, the statutory language is,
in any event, little more than a recommendation.
87
Of course, political imperatives will frequently make broad-based
consultation expedient, and environmental groups are often asked to
present their views. Even under reformed procedures, however, the
influence of environmental interests in Germany would be more lim-
ited than it is in the United States. Private environmental groups are
numerous, but few have the technical capacity to mount a serious
challenge to the conventional policymaking and standard-setting pro-
cess. 88 Strong private groups would be unnecessary if political parties
such as the Greens could provide a viable substitute; but under mod-
Rucht & Winfried Kretschmer eds., i988); ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 53, ch. 7. The only
explicit provision for participation of organized groups is in the Nature Protection Law, which
permits a limited number of state-designated groups to participate in some state and local
planning processes. See Naturschutzgesetz [NatSchG] § 29, 1987 BGBI. I 880, 902-03.
85 The ordinances that govern the federal ministries require that they inform national orga-
nizations representing concerned interests and consult with them before a rule or guideline is
issued. The plans of ministries need not be public documents, and persons consulted can be
required to keep them confidential. See Gemeinsame Geschiiftsordnung der Bundesministerien
[GGO] II §§ 24, 67, 78. If independent experts testify, the Ministry selects them, and their
testimony is not generally made public. See GGO I § 61(3). These ordinances are only internal
administrative rules and have no legal force. See MAUNZ, DORIG, HERZOG, SCHOLZ, PAPIER,
RANDELZHOFER & SCHMIDT-ASSMANN, supra note 5I, art. 80, at 22; Fritz Ossenbilhl, Rechts-
verordnung, in 3 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 387,
389, 416-17 (Josef Isenee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1988); see also id. at 414 (providing examples
of statutes that require the participation of incorporated groups, organizations, or individual
experts).
86 Some statutes, such as the Federal Water Act, impose no constraints. See Wasserhaus-
haltsgesetz [WHG] § 7a, 1986 BGB1. I 1529, 1531; Lribbe-Wolff, supra note 62, at 228. The
Air and Noise Pollution Act states that the ministry "shall hear" representatives of those directly
affected as well as representatives of the scientific community, the trade, industry and traffic
sectors, and the responsible Land authorities. Environmental organizations are not included in
the list of "parties concerned." See Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz [BImSchG] § 51, 1974 BGB1.
I 721, 733. Compare Abfallgesetz [AbfG] § i6, 1986 BGB1. I 1410, 1418 (requiring, like the
Air and Noise Pollution Act, that the ministry consult with affected parties before issuing
regulations) with Chemikaliengesetz [ChemG] § 17(), (7), i98o BGB1. I 1718, 1724, amended
by 199o BGBI. I 521, 530 (including several types of public interest groups in the list of parties
with whom the ministry must consult).
87 See MAUNZ, DORiG, HERZOG, SCHOLZ, PAPIER, RANDELZHOFER & SCHMIDT-ASsMANN,
supra note 5i, art. 80, at 22; Ossenbiihl, supra note 85, at 416-17.
8s Most environmental groups are poorly staffed and funded. See Dieter Rucht, Von der
Bewegung zur Institution? Organisationsstrukturen der Okologiebewegung, in NEUE SOZIALE
BEWEGUNGEN IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 334, 354-56 (Roland Roth & Dieter
Rucht eds., 2d ed. igi).
1994] 1295
HeinOnline -- 107 Harv. L. Rev.  1295 1993-1994
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ern conditions, in which much policy is made in administrative pro-
ceedings, rather than in the legislature, partisan political activity pro-
vides an insufficient review of policymaking.8 9
3. Lessons for America. - The German experience with consensual
procedures counsels caution. Advisory committees, federal-state
working groups, and quasi-private committees of technical experts all
influence German technical standards and public policies. The system
is thus accountable to the scientific community, to business, and to
lower-level governments. It is only indirectly accountable to the pub-
lic and to the environmental community, through the cabinet's re-
sponsibility to the parliament and through the voluntary efforts of the
ministry and its advisers. Although some American critics might find
the resulting process close to ideal, it is ill-suited to the nature of
many of the problems facing the administrative state.
German consensual processes fail to measure up to American no-
tions of political accountability and thus are not a legitimate policy
choice for the United States. Even the admission of environmental
groups or citizens' organizations in an attempt to make the negotiating
bodies more representative would not solve the problem. Although
private groups can be an important source of information about both
technical and political matters, they cannot make strong claims to
represent the general public in regulatory negotiations. Environmental
organizations should, of course, be heard by the bureaucracy in con-
ventional rulemaking procedures. In the United States such groups
also have the expertise and organizational capacity to challenge faulty
rulemaking procedures in court. These legitimate and important roles
do not, however, imply that these groups can speak for the public in
regulatory negotiations. Once one admits this shortcoming, it becomes
clear that even consensual decisions that involve these groups lack
legitimacy. No amount of tinkering with the proceedings will over-
come the fundamental mismatch between the consensual approach
and the policy problem. Regulatory negotiation is not a good way to
ensure the accountability of those making far-ranging environmental
policy choices. The German experience supports my conclusion that
consensual decisionmaking can produce legitimate decisions only in a
narrow range of environmental issues.
C. Judicial Review
According to German democratic theory, political actors do an
adequate job of monitoring bureaucratic policymaking activities.
89 Green activists can, however, point to their role in helping to generate popular support
for a tough 1983 regulation that has reduced sulphur dioxide emissions. See Verordnung Qiber
Groflfeuerungsanlagen, Bundesimmissionsschutzverordnung [BImSchV] No. 13, 1983 BGBI. I
719. But see Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, Anglo-German Contrasts in Environmental Policy-
Making and Their Impacts in the Case of Acid Rain Abatement, 4 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 295, 304
(1992) (calling the Greens' "success" into question).
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Thus, preenforcement review of federal administrative rules or guide-
lines is not available. 90 The judiciary's task is, instead, to prevent
the state from riding roughshod over individuals as the state pursues
broad public goals. 91 The German administrative courts devote most
of their time to protecting individual rights, rather than to monitoring
the political and policymaking activities of government.
92
Rules of standing and private rights of action exemplify the Ger-
man understanding of democracy. Conventional public law does not
permit outsiders to challenge executive branch policies in the admin-
istrative courts unless an individual's "subjective rights" have been
violated. 93 The same reasoning that justifies denying individuals and
groups the right to participate in the formulation of general regulations
and legal guidelines94 also justifies excluding them from making direct
legal challenges to these instruments in court.95 Germany also lacks
the range of private rights of action found in American law. German
citizens can defend their individual rights but cannot act as private
attorneys general to help enforce the law.
i. Review of Environmental Issues. - Despite the restrictions on
standing and the narrow range of issues subject to judicial review,
environmental organizations and individual citizens have used the
German courts to raise important issues of public policy, particularly
in the nuclear power area. After mounting several mass protests to
90 See Eckard Rehbinder, Controlling the Environmental Enforcement Deficit: West Ger-
many, 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 373, 376-77 (1976).
91 See GG art. 19(4).
92 See Carl B~hret, Public Administration in a Democracy, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 33, 42 (Klaus K6nig, Hans Joachim von Ortzen & Frido
Wagener eds., i983); Michael S. Greve, The Non-Reformation of Administrative Law: Standing
to Sue and Public Interest Litigation in West-German Environmental Law, 22 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 197, 201-02; Hans Sch5fer, Verfassungs- und Ve-waltungsgerichtsbarkeit, in I STAATSBOR-
GER UND STAATSGEWALT 159, 170 (Helmut R. Kfalz & Richard Naumann eds., 1963).
93 See Rudolf Steinberg, Venwaltungsgerichtlicher Umweltschutz: Voraussetzungen und Reich-
weite der egoistischen Umweltschutzklage, 11/12 UMWELT- UND PLANuINGSRECHT 350, 358
(1984). One partial exception occurs in planning law, because the Baugesetzbuch requires that
public and private interests be balanced. See Baugesetzbuch [BauGB] § i(6), 1986 BGBl. I
2253, 2254. Judicial review of the adequacy of this weighing process is possible. See Letter
from Prof. Winfried Brohm, Faculty of Law, University of Konstanz, to Prof. Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Yale Law School 2 (June 7, 1993) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
94 See supra p. 1288.
95 Actions challenging the constitutionality of a state or federal law, or challenging the
compatibility of state law with federal law, cannot be used to review legal regulations and are
not available to private individuals or groups. Such cases can only be brought by state or
federal governments or by one-third of the members of the Bundestag. See GG art. 93(1)(2).
"Concrete norm-control" actions under GG art. zoo(r), which deals with inter-court referrals of
constitutional questions, apply only to formal laws, not to regulations. See Ossenbiihl, supra
note 85, at 422-23. The administrative courts can invalidate Liinder regulations (Rechtsvor-
schriften) through "norm-control" actions brought by individuals who have been damaged or
who expect to be damaged. See Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] § 47, 196o BGB1. I 17,
22; Ossenhifil, supra note 85, at 422-23.
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the licensing of particular nuclear plants, 96 environmental activists
and concerned neighbors brought their opposition before the courts.
These cases, although seldom successful on the merits, did serve to
delay projects and raise public concern.
97
Local citizens' initiatives (Biirgerinitiativen) have helped to orga-
nize the concerned public. 98 However, neither organized environmen-
tal groups nor Bilrgerinitiativen can be plaintiffs unless they can
demonstrate that their organization's rights have been violated. 99 To
meet this requirement and obtain standing, Biirgerinitiativen have
purchased land near major projects - a practice upheld by the Fed-
eral Administrative Court.'
00
Outside of those Biirgerinitiativen that have been able to purchase
nearby land, access to court is limited to neighbors of planned facilities
and to residents of communities where nature protection plans will be
96 For a series of case studies involving nuclear plants, see VON DER BITTSCHRIFT ZUR
PLATZBESETZUNG: KONFLIKTE UM TECHNISCHE GROSSPROJEKTE, cited above in note 84. Im-
portant projects often provoked demonstrations with tens of thousands of objectors. See Dieter
Rucht, Wyhl: Der Aufbruch der Anti-Atomkraftbewegung, in VON DER BITTSCHRIFT ZUR PLATZ-
BESETZUNG: KONFLIKTE UM TECHNISCHE GROSSPROJEKTE, sup-a note 84, at 128, 149.
97 See Jost Halfmann, Social Change and Political Mobilization in West Germany, in IN-
DUSTRY AND POLITICS IN WEST GERAiANY: TOWARD THE THIRD REPUBLIC 51, 81 (Peter J.
Katzenstein ed., 1989); Eckard Rehbinder, The Role of Administrative Courts in West Germany
24 (1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (stating that
nuclear power cases "have seldom been successful on the merits in the first instance and never
in the second and third instances"). For examples of how activists have used the courts, see
DOROTHY NELKIN & MICHAEL POLLAK, THE ATOM BESIEGED 155-66 (1981); and Rucht, cited
above in note 96, at 136-37.
99 Over time some of these groups have taken on a more permanent character. An umbrella
organization, called the Bundesverband Bfirgerinitiativen Umweltschutz (BBU), was founded in
1972. See Rucht, supra note 88, at 355.
99 See Rehbinder, supra note 97, at 16-17; see also VwGO § 42(2), 196o BGBI. I 17, 22
("Unless otherwise determined by law, suit is admissible only if the plaintiff claims to be violated
in his rights by the administrative act or its denial or omission."). It is not enough that the
government's action be illegal. In addition the plaintiff must actually have been injured in a
"subjective," or individual, right. See Hans Jarass, Drittschutz im Unweltrecht, in FEST-
SCHRIFT FOR RUDOLF LUKES 57, 58 (Herbert Leflmann, Bernhard Groflfeld & Lothar Vollmer
eds., 1989).
The only exceptions are very limited state law provisions concerning implementation of the
Nature Protection Law, which permit groups to participate in some state and local planning
processes. They do not, however, give those groups access to the judiciary. See NatSchG § 29,
1987 BGB1. I 889, 902-03. Ten of the German states permit nature protection groups to
challenge their procedures in court. The Federal Administrative Court has upheld the consti-
tutionality of such provisions, see Judgment of Dec. i8, 1987, 78 Entscheidungen des Bundes-
verwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE] 347, 353-56, and even in the absence of such provisions, has
allowed a nature protection group access to court to claim that it was not consulted at all, see
Judgment of Oct. 31, 199o, io Neue Zeitschrift ffir Verwaltungsrecht [NVwZ] 162, 164-65.
100 See Rudolf Steinberg, Judicial Review of Environmentally-Related Administrative Deci-
sion-Making, ii TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 61, 64 (1992). The Administrative Court has held that
it is acceptable for organizations to obtain standing through the purchase of a small piece of
property in the neighborhood of the challenged project. See Judgment of July 12, 1985, 72
BVerwGE 15, 16.
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implemented or plants built. ' 0 ' Yet some projects, such as coal-fired
and atomic power plants, produce geographically far-reaching harms.
Others, such as conservation proposals, benefit nature lovers living
far from the site but arouse opposition from nearby neighbors. Stand-
ing in such cases is all but impossible for those who live at a distance
from the project. ' 0 2 They must show that injury is likely - a difficult
task for most potential plaintiffs.' 0 3 Although the administrative
courts have not completely ruled out claims of long-distance harm,
the damage one might suffer in a possible nuclear power plant accident
is not sufficient for standing purposes. ' 0 4 A high risk of injury to a
few people may confer standing, but a small risk of injury to millions
of people does not.' 05
Once granted standing, individuals can defend only their own
particular interests, not public interests.10 6 Thus, an individual can-
not threaten an entire project if the problem can be solved with
specific protective measures or with the payment of compensation.10 7
Furthermore, if only neighbors have standing to challenge a project,
a solution crafted by the courts may reflect only the concerns of the
neighbors, whose rights are the only ones implicated under German
law. For instance, a court might order the construction of highway
embankments to limit noise or the payment of compensation for the
purchase of soundproof windows - measures that will not satisfy
those seeking preservation of the natural landscape.' 08
101 See Thomas A. Ormond, Environmental Group Actions in West Germany, in PARTIcI-
PATION AND LITIGATION RIGHTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSOCIATIONS IN EUROPE 77, 82-83
(Martin Fiihr & Gerhard Roller eds., i9gi); Steinberg, supra note ioo, at 63-69.
102 See Steinberg, supra note 93, at 355-56. The courts have defined the neighborhood of
a nuclear power station to be a zone of about 30 kilometers around the plant. See Ormond,
supra note ioi, at 82; see also Wolfgang Baumann, Betroffensein durch Grojfvorhaben: Ober-
legungen zuin Rechtsschutz imn Atomrecht (pt. x), 9 BAYERISCHE VERwALTUNGSBLATTER 257,
259-60 (1982) (reviewing the nuclear power cases up to 1982).
103 In one case, an individual who lived 45 kilometers from a nuclear power plant argued
that he should be treated as a neighbor subject to "other hazards" under the Air Pollution and
Noise Control Act. See BImSchG § 5(I), 1974 BGB1. I 721, 724. If he were judged a neighbor,
he could claim a right to participate in the licensing hearing. See id. § io, i974 BGBl. I, at
725. However, the Federal Administrative Court denied him standing to bring his complaint
before the administrative courts. Although the court admitted that procedural failures could
produce violations of constitutional rights, it judged the risk of an explosion, on which the claim
was based, to be too small to justify standing. See Judgment of Oct. 22, 1982, 98 Deutsches
Verwaltungsblatt [DVB1] 183, 183-84.
14 See Judgment of Jan. ii, 1985, 7o BVerwGE 365, 368-71; Judgment of Dec. 22, 2980,
6i BVerwGE 256, 262-71; see also Steinberg, supra note Ioo, at 66-67 (criticizing the reasoning
of the latter-case).
105 See Baumann, supra note 102, at 265.
106 See Jarass, supra note 99, at 61-62.
107 See Peter Badura, Schutz Dritter durch Nebenbestimmungen einer Planfeststellung oder
Genehmigung, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR RUDOLF LuREs, supra note 99, at 3, 9-14.
108 See JOHANN BIZER, THOMAS ORMOND & ULRIKE RIEDEL, DIE VERBANDSKLAGE IM
NATURSCHUTZRECHT 28-29 (1990).
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Germany's administrative law system comes close to Justice Scal-
ia's view of the ideal relationship between the courts and administra-
tive agencies. 10 9 Review of high-level actions is difficult because no
statute sets the procedural parameters for ministry policymaking. Ju-
dicial review is not used to safeguard the democratic legitimacy of
rulemaking. And even when the legality of a rule does come before
the court, the judges do not evaluate the procedures used in crafting
that rule.
2. Informal Agreements. - As a consequence of the anemic quality
of judicial review, German executive-branch policymaking tends to
lack formality and accountability. No judicially enforceable statute
constrains administrative policymaking. As a result, informal prom-
ises by industry groups to meet certain standards are sometimes nei-
ther legally binding nor publicly known. 110 Such practices are possible
because the laws permit, but do not require, regulations or guidelines
and set no deadlines for the issuance of formal standards. The use
of informal agreements makes outside review, not only of the process,
but also of the substantive standards, impossible.
To take a concrete case, the government has the legal power to
issue regulations governing the content of detergents.' 1 ' On at least
one occasion, the Minister approved measures laid down in a letter
from four industry associations instead of issuing a legally binding
regulation. The letter was published in a federal register only after
career officials in the Ministry applied pressure." 2 In its published
form, the letter can be distinguished from a regular legal ordinance
only by the absence of section signs. 113 Similar informal agreements
have been used to stop the use of volatile chlorinated hydrocarbons
and to decrease the use of chlorofluorocarbons in spray cans. 114 More
recently, asbestos was regulated by means of an informal letter that
has not been made public." 5
Such practices are less common in the United States, because
American statutes are much more likely to set deadlines and to re-
109 See supra pp. 1285-87.
110 See Rfidiger Breuer, Verhandlungslsungen aus der Sicht des deutschen Umweltschutz-
rechts, in i KONFLIKTBEWALTIGUNG DURCH VERHANDLUNGEN, Supra note 23, at 231, 250-
51; Gerd Winter, Gesetzliche Anforderungen an Grenzwerte far Luftimmissionen, in GRENZ-
WERTE: INTERDISZIPLINXRE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZU EINER RECHTSFIGUR DES UMWELT-, AR-
BEITS- UND LEBENSMITTELSCHUTZES 127, 140-41 (Gerd Winter ed., 1986).
IM See Gesetz Uiber die Umweltvertriiglichkeit von Wasch- und Reinigungsmitteln [WRMG]
§ 9(2), 1987 BGBl. I 875, 878.
112 Interview with Eberhard Bohne, Ministerialrat at the Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety, in Bonn (Feb. 19, 1992) (discussing this incident).
113 See Verfahrensregelung zur Mitteilung der Angaben nach § 9 Wasch- und Reinigungs-
mittelgesetz, 41 BAnz. (Beilage) No. 4oa, at 3-10 (Feb. 25, 1989).
114 See Breuer, supra note iio, at 250-SI.
11s See Interview with Bohne, supra note ii2 (discussing the policymaking process in the
Federal Environmental Ministry).
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quire, rather than simply to permit, rules." 6 Although agencies issue
guidelines and circulars to aid implementation, such measures cannot
legally take the place of rules. Private agreements between regulated
industries and the government generally cannot be handled with the
secrecy and lack of accountability that is possible in Germany.
Nevertheless, informal industry-agency procedures have been used
in the United States under the pesticide law,1 17 and voluntary com-
pliance programs have been proposed for substances that contribute
to global warming. 118 These practices raise concerns about effective-
ness and democratic accountability. Less problematic is the provision
in the i99o amendments to the Clean Air Act that encourages pro-
ducers of air toxins to reduce their discharges "voluntarily" in advance
of a formal, technology-based rule. Firms that reduce their discharges
by 90% before the applicable rule is proposed are exempt from the
rule for six years, provided they meet an alternative standard reflecting
their initial reduction. 119 This measure gives firms an incentive to act
quickly despite the long lead time needed to produce rules. Because
the early reduction program sets definite statutory guidelines for im-
plementation, it provides a flexible solution without sacrificing dem-
ocratic legitimacy, openness, or clarity.
III. CONCLUSIONS
An analysis of German administrative law and practice can help
Americans decide whether they wish to move toward a system that
restricts judicial review of agency policymaking processes. Given the
necessity of delegation, and the rise in the use of private experts and
informal procedures, the risks of unconstrained administrative power
should be clear. The informal, undocumented, and poorly understood
processes outlined above suggest the kinds of problems that can arise.
The American bureaucracy, lacking Germany's close connection be-
tween executive and legislature, would have even more independent
power than German authorities if not constrained by procedural limits.
Judicial review of high-level policymaking processes provides a needed
116 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a)(I), 7411(b)(I), 7412(b)(i) (I988) (requiring the EPA to
publish air pollution regulations before certain prescribed dates).
117 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 631 F.2d 922, 924-25, 932-37 (198o) (de-
scribing the EPA's "Rebuttable Presumption Against Registration" proceeding), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1112 (1981); CHRISTOPHER J. Bosso, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A
PUBLIC ISSUE 194-97 (1987).
11 See John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Urging Voluntary Goals on Air Pollution, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at A23; Margaret Kriz, Lukewarm, 25 NAT'L J. 2028, 2028 (1993).
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(5) (Supp. I1 1991); OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION &
TOXICS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA'S 33/50 PROGRAM, FOURTH PROG-
RESS UPDATE 1-7 (1993).
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check on agencies' tendency to ignore the democratic basis of their
power.
Americans need to distinguish between relatively superficial prob-
lems, which stem from failures of management, financial resources,
and bureaucratic competence, and more basic flaws in the structure
of democratic government itself. Even if the current American review
process is cumbersome and imperfect, it responds to a genuine prob-
lem. Bureaucratic processes that emphasize openness and reasoned
decisionmaking help to justify the necessary delegation of policymak-
ing to the executive. The courts can enhance the democratic legiti-
macy of the modern American state by ensuring that basic procedural
conditions are met. Americans should not rush either to embrace
consensual processes or to remove the courts from their role as mon-
itors of democratic legitimacy.
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